Emissions Skyrocket: Are Forests Half to Blame?

Emissions Beyond the Smokestack

When many people see that global greenhouse gas emissions reached a record high in 2024, they first think of factories, gasoline vehicles, and power plants. But the most counterintuitive figure in this context is that while the annual emission growth rate was about 2.3%, net carbon emissions from land use, land-use change, and forestry surged by about 21%, accounting for roughly 53% of the increase in emissions. In other words, more than half of the additional emissions stemmed from the deteriorating land and forest accounts, meaning the increase cannot be explained solely by continued emissions from the fossil fuel system.

The UNEP Emissions Gap Report provides a more comprehensive emissions accounting: emissions related to the extraction, production, and use of fossil fuels account for the bulk of the total, running at high levels in 2024; however, the increase is not entirely explained by smokestacks. Wildfires, land disturbance, and degraded carbon sinks have turned systems that would otherwise absorb carbon into amplifiers of net emissions in certain years.

Forests are not stable.

In climate discussions, forests are often treated as natural assets for “offsetting emissions”: growing trees absorb carbon dioxide, while soils and vegetation store carbon. Yet the LULUCF accounting framework reminds us that forests are not merely a silent backdrop working quietly in perpetuity. Logging, degradation, fires, and land conversion can all alter this ledger, potentially weakening carbon sinks or even turning them into net sources of emissions.

This is why the 2024 emissions increase looks like an accounting reversal: fossil fuel emissions have not disappeared, and major emitting countries and high-emission economies still determine the baseline totals; yet abnormal fluctuations in the land and forest sectors have pushed that year’s increment curve significantly higher. G20 members account for the majority of global greenhouse gas emissions, indicating that industrial and energy systems remain the primary long-term battleground; meanwhile, the 2024 increment was further significantly amplified by the land and forestry sectors.

This does not mean “factories bear no responsibility”; focusing solely on factories would miss half the increase. Evidence in the report regarding major emitters, energy demand, and fossil fuel-related emissions still indicates that traditional emission sources remain the foundation of the total; but as to why it jumped even higher in 2024, one of the key variables is the increase in net emissions following shocks to natural systems.

How Wildfires Affect the Carbon Ledger

Forest fires impact emissions far beyond the smoke released at the moment of combustion. Fires rapidly release carbon stored in tree trunks, dead branches, leaf litter, and parts of the soil; forest recovery after a fire takes time, during which its carbon absorption capacity declines; and if extreme weather makes fires more frequent and intense, carbon stores accumulated over many years will be released in a short period of time.

The specific figures provided in the report quantify this mechanism in terms of annual changes: in 2024, global emissions hit a record high, growing by about 2.3%; in the same year, net carbon emissions from land use and forestry surged by about 21%, accounting for about 53% of that year’s increase in emissions. This proportion explains why the claim of “bearing half the blame” in the question holds true: it does not mean that wildfires exceeded all industrial emissions, but rather that in “the extra emissions compared to the previous year,” the deterioration of the land and forest ledger accounted for more than half.

This distinction is crucial. In terms of total volume, fossil fuel-related emissions remain the primary source of global climate pressure; in terms of incremental changes, the destruction of natural carbon sinks in a given year can become one of the largest drivers. Only by separating totals from increments can we understand why the same report emphasizes emission reductions in energy systems while also bringing anomalous changes in the land and forest sectors to the forefront of the climate ledger.

Uncertainty also exists.

LULUCF data presents inherent challenges. It requires estimating carbon fluxes in and out of forests, soils, land conversion, fires, and restoration processes, which is not as straightforward as accounting for the combustion of coal, oil, and gas. The very fact that the report includes land use and forestry in its emissions ledger underscores that this sector is not only critical but also more susceptible to variations in measurement, modeling, and annual natural fluctuations.

Therefore, the 2024 figures cannot be reduced to the simplistic claim that “wildfires are the sole culprit.” A more accurate statement is that, under the accounting framework provided in the report, the substantial rise in net carbon emissions from land use and forestry explains approximately 53% of the 2024 emission increase; this conclusion is sufficient to correct the assumption that “rising emissions equate solely to rising industrial emissions,” but it does not negate the long-term primary responsibility of fossil fuel emissions.

Another easy pitfall is shifting focus to emerging electricity demand. The report does mention demand sources such as electric vehicles, heat pumps, and data centers, but in this specific context, they cannot account for over half of the 2024 emissions increase. The main narrative remains the destabilization of the land and forest ledger in extreme years, and the amplification of the global emissions increase driven by this instability.

True Contrast

This contrast lies not in the notion that “nature is worse than industry,” but rather in the ingrained habit of treating nature as a buffer against climate issues. Data from 2024 indicates that natural carbon sinks can also be compromised. When forests shift from carbon absorbers to emission accelerators, the global emissions curve suddenly exhibits an additional surge that defies common-sense explanation.

This also affects the pressure on the 1.5°C pathway: for every additional year without deep emission reductions, the scale of carbon dioxide removal required in the future to return to 1.5°C will increase. Once forest and land systems are degraded, it not only results in higher emissions for that year, but also makes it more difficult to “make up the deficit” later on.

Thus, the surge in emissions in 2024 sends a clear signal: global emission reduction cannot be understood solely as burning fewer fossil fuels, though this remains central; it must also involve protecting the very systems that help humanity absorb carbon. Otherwise, the failure of carbon sinks will turn the emission reduction bill into a double burden: continuing to emit on the one hand, while absorbing less on the other.

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Source institutions：United Nations Environment Programme

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